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FELIX MALLON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF 
LONG BEACH (a Corporation) et al., Respondents; 
ALMA SWART, Intervener and Appellant. 
[1] Waters-Tidelands-Limitations on Alienation.-The trust in 
which tide and submerged lands are held does not prevent 
state from reclaiming such lands from sea where it can be done 
without prejudice to public right of navigation and applying 
them to other purposes and uses. 
[2] Municipal Corporations-Tidelands-Grant to City by State.-
Where tide and submerged lands have been granted in trust 
to city of Long Beach by state, partial revocation of trust as 
to income derived from extraction of minerals inbedded in 
lands subject to trust will not impair public interest in com-
merce, navigation and fisheries in Long Beach harbor, and 
thus such revocation does not conflict with manifest purposes 
of Const., art. XV, §§ 2, 3, relating to tidelands fronting on 
waters of harbor. 
[3] Id.-Tidelands-Conclusiveness of Legislative Determination. 
-Where Legislature has "found and determined" that, to ex-
tent of partial revocation of trust as to income derived from 
extraction of minerals imbedded in tide and submerged lands 
granted to city of Long Beach by state subject to trust, in-
eome derived from production of oil and gas from such lands 
"is no longer required for navigation, commerce and fisheries, 
Dor for such uses, trusts, conditions as are imposed by" statutes 
granting such lands in trust (Stats. 1951, p. 2445), such de-
termination is conclusive on reviewing court in absence of evi-
dence indicating that abandonment of public trust will impair 
power of succeeding legislatures to protect, improve and de-
velop public interest in commerce, navigation and fisheries. 
[4] Id.-Tidelands-Conclusiveness of Legislative Determination. 
-In action to enjoin city of Long Beach and its officers from 
appropriating and expending for general municipal purposes 
income derived from sale of gas produced from tide and 
submerged lands of Long Beach harbor which Legislature has 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 541 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 293 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
~{unicipal Corporations, § 491. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 452; [2,5,7,10,11,14,15] 
Municipal Corporations, § 382; [3, 4] Municipal Corporatinns, 
§386j [6] Trusts, §170j [8] Municipal Corporations, §81; [9] 
Municipal Corporations, § 86; [12] State of California, § 33; [13] 
State of Califoma, § 34. 
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determined is no longer required for navigation, COUlmerce 
and fisheries, nor for such uses as are imposed by statutes 
granting sucb lands to city in trust (Stats. 1951, p. 2445), con-
tention that succeeding generations might have need for monies 
thus freed from trust for development and improvement of 
state's harbors, waterways and fisheries is matter of specula-
tion and insufficient in itself to overcome legislative determina-
tion; and since revocation of trust to that extent does not 
contemplate or authorize alienation of tide and submerged 
lands free from trust, succeeding legislatures can, if they deem 
it necessary for purposes of trust, reestablish public trust on 
all income derived from production of oil and gas from such 
lands. 
[6] Id.-Tidelands-Grant to City by State.-Rule governing pri-
vate trusts that, in absence of express provision to contrary, 
revocation of trust results in reversion of trust property to 
settlor (Civ. Code, § 2280) is applicable to trust on which tide 
and submerged lands were conveyed to city of Long Beach. 
[6] Trusts-Interest and Estate of Trustee.-Trustees normally 
hold title to corpus of trust in fee simple, but only for purpose 
of carrying out objects of trust; when trust is terminated, 
corpus does not become individual property of trustee, but 
reverts to settlor. 
[7] Municipal Corporations-Tidelands-Grant to City by State.-
State acting through Legislature has power to alter con-
tractual or property rights acquired by municipal corporation 
from state for governmental purposes, even if conveyance of 
tide and submerged lands to city of Long Beach by state sub-
ject to trust be considered as contract between city and state 
or as creating property interests in city. 
[8] ld.-Legislative Control.-A municipal corporation has no 
privileges or immunities under federal Constitution that it can 
invoke against will of state, and under Cal. Const., art. XI, 
§ 6, a freeholder city, such as city of Long Beach, is exempt 
from legislative control only as to "municipal affairs." 
[9] Id.-Legislative Control-Municipal Affairs.-Any interest of 
city of Long Beach in tidelands granted to it by state was ac-
quired not as "municipal affair," but subject to public trust 
to deVelop its harbor and navigation facilities for benefit of 
entire state, and is therefore subject to legislative control. 
[lOa, lOb] Id.-Tidelands-Grant to City by State.-U statutory 
revocation of trust as to income derived from production of oil 
and gas from tide and suhmerged lands granted to city of Long 
Beach by state subject to trust (Stats. 1951, p. 2445) were to 
operate as transfer of monies affected thereby to such city, 
such tranf;fer would be gift of public monies in violation of 
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Const., art. IV, § 31, there being no benefit to all people of 
state from such transfer. 
[11] ld.-Tidelands-Grant to Oity by State.-Grants in trust of 
tide and submerged lands to municipal corporations have been 
made in furtherance of interest of entire state in development 
of its harbors, and such grants do not violate constitutional 
prohibition against gifts. (Const., art. IV, § 31.) 
[12] State of Oalifornia-Gift of Public Funds.-Const., art. IV, 
§ 31, specifically forbids making of gift of public monies or 
thing of value to any municipal corporation, and fact that 
funds transferred to city would be expended for public pur-
poses authorized by city charter is immaterial, since all lawful 
4>%penditures of cities are necessarily for public purposes. 
[13] ld.-Gift of Public Funds.-Construction and establishment 
by city of storm drains, city incinerator, public library, public 
hospitals, public parks, fire alarm system, off-street parking 
facilities, city streets and highways, and other expenditures 
that have been authorized by city charter to be made from 
public improvement fund are not of such general statewide in-
terest that state funds can properly be expended thereon; such 
expenditures are for purely "municipal affairs" within meaning 
of Const., art. XI, § 6, and are normal expenditures for munici-
pal corporation to make, and a grant of public monies from 
state to defray such expenditures violates Const., art. IV, § 31, 
forbidding making of gifts of public monies to municipal cor-
porations. 
[14] Municipal Oorporations-Tidelands-Grant to Oity by State. 
-Partial revocation of trust effected by statute as to income 
derived from production of oil and gas from tide and sub-
merged lands granted to city of Long Beach by state subject 
to trust (Stats. 1951, p. 2445) necessarily results in reversion 
to state of monies thus released from trust, and city holds such 
funds on resulting trust for state. 
[16] Id.-Tidelands-Grant to Oity by State.-Statutory provision 
that income "heretofore derived or to be derived" by city of 
Long Beach from production of "dry gas" from tide and sub-
merged lands granted to city by state subject to trust is free 
from public trust (Stats. 1951, p. 2445) does not validate un-
lawful expenditure of such income for general municipal pur-
poses, and city holds such funds subject to resulting trust in 
favor of state. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County. Paul Nourse, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to enjoin a city and its officers from appropriating 
and expending income derived from sale of oil and gas pro-
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city by state. Judgment for defendants after demurrers to 
complaint were sustained without leave to amend, reversed. 
Stratton & Taylor, Chas. C. Stratton and Mark L. Taylor 
for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Theodore R. Gabrielson and Kenneth E. Matot for Inter-
vener and Appellant. 
Preston, Braucht & George, Crowe, Mitchell & Hurlbutt, 
Neil Cunningham and J. Thomas Crowe as Amici Curiae OD 
behalf of Intervener and Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, E. G. Benard, Assist-
ant Attorney General, Leonard M. Friedman and George G. 
Grover, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Appellants. 
Walhfred Jacobson, City Attorney, Joseph B. Lamb, Assist-
ant City Attorney, Atlee S. Arnold, Deputy City Attorney, 
O'Melveny & Myers, Louis W. Myers, Pierce Works and 
William W. Alsup for Respondents. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Bourke 
Jones and Arthur W. Nordstrom, Assistant City Attorneys, as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents. 
TRA YNOR, J .-Plaintiff and plaintiff in intervention ap-
peal from a judgment for defendants entered after defendants' 
demurrers to their complaints were sustained without leave 
to amend. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants from appro-
priating and expending for general municipal purposes the 
income derived from the sale of oil and gas produced from 
the tide and submerged lands granted in trust to the city of 
Long Beach by the State of California. (Stat8. 1911, p. 1304, 
as amended by ~tats. 1925, p. 235, Stats. 1935, p. 793, and 
8tats. 1951, p. 2443.) The expenditures to which plaintiffs 
object are purportedly authorized by a duly enacted amend-
ment to tb~ charter of the city of Long Beach, the material 
parts of which provide: 
"The' Public Improvement Fund' is hereby created and 
established. . . . Money placed therein shall be used exclu-
sively for the payment of costs and expenses for the acquisi. 
tion, construction, reconstruction, development, operation, re-
pair and maintenance of public improvements and the acquisi-
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tion of such lands, rights and property as may be necessary 
or convenient therefor .... 
"\Vithin thirty days after the effective date of this section, 
the City Treasurer shall transfer to the 'Public Improvement 
Fund' fifty per cent of all revenue derived by the City from 
oil, gas and other hydrocarbons, and fifty per cent of the 
interest, earnings, income and/or profits from investment of 
said revenue which is in the 'Harbor Revenue Fund' on the 
date of such transfer. \Vithin said thirty days, he shall also 
. transfer to the 'Public Improvement Fund' fifty per cent 
of all revenue in the' Harbor Reserve Fund' and the' Tideland 
Oil Fund' on the date of such transfer. 
"At least once each calendar month thereafter, the City 
Treasurer shall transfer to the 'Public Improvement Fund' 
fifty per cent of all revenue derived by the City from oil, 
gas and other hydrocarbons and placed in the' Harbor Revenue 
Fund,' which is not required by this Charter to be transferred 
from said 'Harbor Revenue Fund' to the 'Harbor Reserve 
Fund. ' He shall also transfer to the 'Public Improvement 
Fund,' at least once each calendar month thereafter, fifty 
per cent of all revenue so derived, which is required by this 
Charter to be transferred to the 'Harbor Reserve Fund' and 
fifty per cent of all revenue, so derived, which is required 
by this chapter to be placed in the 'Tideland Oil Fund.'" 
(Charter of the city of Long Beach § 260.8, approved by con-
current resolution of the Legislature [Const., art. XI, § &], 
Stats. 1953, p. 3826.) . 
The Harbor Revenue Fund (Stats. 1931, p. 2807), the 
Harbor Reserve Fund (Stats. 1949, p. 2857), and the Tide-
land Oil Fund (Stats. 2d Ex. Sess. 1946, p. 367; Stats. 1949, 
p. 2857) arp. depositories of the income derived from the 
production of oil and gas from the tide and submerged lands 
granted to the city by the state, except for the income derived 
from the production of "dry gas" from those lands, which 
is handled separately and is discussed below. Plaintiffs claim 
that th\:> transfers authorized by this charter amendment and 
the expenditures pursuant thereto are unla",ful. Defendants 
contend that the type of expenditures enumerated in the 
amendment are proper ones for a municipality to make, and 
that the transfers ordered by the amendment are authorized 
by chapter 915 of the Statutes of 1951. That statute provides: 
"Section 1. It is hereby found and determined: That 
the City of Long Beach since 1939 has produced and is 
DOW producing large quantities of oil, gas and other hydro-
) 
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carbon substances from lands conveyed to said city by [the 
statutes cited above]. That from the revenue derived there-
from. said city has constructed upon said lands, wharves, 
docks, piers, slips, quays, and other utilities, structures and 
appliances necessary or convenient for the promotion and 
accommodation of commerce and navigation, at a cost of 
approximately thirty-five million dollars ($35,000,000). That 
said city has available and unexpended approximately sev-
enty-five million dollars ($75,000,000), also derived from said 
source, for the uses and purposes required by said acts. and 
is now receiving and will continue to receive for many years 
approximately twenty-four million dollars ($24,000,000) per 
annum from said source. That, in addition thereto, said city 
obtains large quantities of 'dry gas' derived from natural 
gas produced from said lands, which is sold by said city to 
domestic and other consumers. That by reason of the already 
large expenditure on such lands for the uses and purposes 
required by said acts, the large additional sums available and 
to become available throughout the years for such purposes, 
the expenditure of more than a total of fifty per centum 
(50%) of such revenue, received and unexpended and here-
after to become available for such uses and purposes, would 
be economically impracticable, unwise and unnecessary. That 
fifty per centum (50%) of all revenue heretofore derived 
and unexpended, and to be derived, by the City of Long Beach 
from oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances, other than 
'dry gas,' produced from lands conveyed by said acts, is no 
longer required for navigation, commerce and fisheries, nor 
for such uses, trusts, conditions and restrictions as are 
imposed by said acts. That none of the revenue heretofore 
derived, and to be derived, by said city from' dry gas' obtained 
from said lands is any longer required for navigation, com-
merce and fisheries, nor for such uses, trusts, conditions and 
restrictions as are imposed by said acts. 
"For the purposes of this act, 'dry gas' is defined to mean 
the gas directly produced from wells, which contains one-half 
of a gallon or less of recoverable gasoline per 1,000 cubic feet, 
or from which gasoline has been removed by processing. 
"Sec. 2. 'rhat fifty per centum (50%) of all revenue 
heretofore derived and unexpended, and to be derived, by 
the City of Long Beach from oil, gas and other hydrocarbon 
-----substarrces-;-ottrer -than-' dry -gas~produeed-from lands-con-
veyed by said abovc-ciltitlctl acts is hereby declared to be 
free from the public trust for navigation, commerce and 
) 
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fisheries, and from such uses, trusts, conditions and restric-
tions as are imposed by any of said above-entitled acts. That 
all of the revenue heretofore derived, and to be derived, by 
said city from 'dry gas,' obtained from said lands is hereby 
declared to be free from the public trust for navigation, 
commerce and fisheries, and from such uses, trusts, conditions 
and restrictions as are imposed by any of said above-entitled 
acts. " (Stats. 1951, pp. 2444-2445.) 
The tide and submerged lands from which the monies in 
question are derived were originally owned b~ the State 
subject to a trust for purposes of commerce, navigation, and 
fisheries for the benefit of all the people of the state. (City 
of Long Beach v. Morse, 31 Cal.2d 254, 262 [188 P.2d 17]; 
City of Long Beach v. Marshall, 11 Ca1.2d 609, 614 [82 P.2d 
362] ; Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 183, 189 [273 P. 797] ; 
City of Long Beach v. Lisenby, 175 Cal. 575, 579 [166 P. 
333] ; People v. Califorma Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 584 /138 
P. 79], quoting from Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 
U.S. 387,452-453 [13 8.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018].) The Legis-
lature committed the administration of this trust to the city 
of Long Beach (City of Long Beach v. Lisenby, supra, 175 
Cal. 575, 579; and see Pub. Resources Code, § 6875) by con-
veying the lands involved to the city in fee simple (City of 
Long Beach v. Marshall, s'upra, 11 Ca1.2d 609, 613) subject 
to an express trust that they be devoted exclusively to the 
improvement of commerce, navigation, and fisheries for the 
benefit of all the people of the state. (Ibid.; Atwood v. 
Hammond, 4 Ca1.2d 31, 37-38 [48 P.2d 20], and cases cited.) 
The lands granted included the minerals therein, which 
are also subject to the trust. (City of Long Beach v. Morse, 
lupra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, 257-258; City of Long Beach v. Mar-
shall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609, 614; Trickey v. City of Long 
Beach, 101 Cal.App.2d 871, 879 [226 P.2d 694].) Before 
the enactment of the 1951 statute, quoted above, we held 
that "the proceeds from the sale of oil and gas from th~ 
lands in question may not be used for any purposes other 
than those specified in the trust conveyances under which 
the [city of Long Beach] claims title to the lands. The 
Legislature specified purposes relating to the harbor that it 
deemed beneficial to the state as a whole and did not authorize 
the city of Long Beach to use the corpus or the income of 
the trust for strictly local improvements." (City of Long 
Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Cal.2c1 254, 262; see also Trickey 
v. Cit" of Long Beach, supra, 101 Cal.App.2d 871, 880.) 
-) 
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The transfers and expenditures authorized by the 1953 amend-
ment to the charter of the city of Long Beach are of the 
same character as those declared unlawful in the Morse case. 
(See Stats. 2d Ex. Sess. 1946, pp. 366, 367.) The lawfulness 
of those transfers and expenditures depends, therefore, on 
the validity and effect of the 1951 statute revoking in part 
the public trust on the income derived from the lands in 
question. Thus, the principal issues to be resolved in the 
present case are whether the revocation was a valid exercise 
of the legislative power, whether the revocation operated as 
a transfer from the state to the city of the monies affected 
thereby, and, if so, whether such a transfer would offend the 
constitutional prohibition against gifts of public monies. 
[1] It is well established that "[ t ] he trust in which tide 
and submerged lands are held does not prevent the state from 
reclaiming tide and submerged lands from the sea where it 
can be done without prejudice to the public right of naviga-
tion and applying them to other purposes and uses." (Boone 
v. Kingsbury, s"upra, 206 Cal. 148, 189; Illinois Oentral R. 00. 
v. Illinois, supra, 146 U.S. 387,452-453; Atwood v. Hammond, 
supra, 4 Cal.2d 31, 41; Oakland v. Oakland Waterfront 00., 
118 Cal. 160, 183-185 [50 P. 277] ; People v. Oalifornia Fish 
00., supra, 166 Cal. 576, 585-586; Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 
365, 372·373.) This principle has never been judicially 
applied in this state to the partial revocation of the public 
trust as to the income derived from the extraction of minerals 
imbedded in the lands subject to the trust, but the Legislature 
has devoted such income from tide and submerged lands held 
by the state to uses unconnected with the purposes of the 
public trust. (See Stats. 1921, chap. 303, § 19; Pub. Resources 
Code, § 6816.) Furthermore, we can see no real distinction 
between reclamation of peripheral lands that become, in the 
course of harbor development, unusable for purposes of the 
trust (Atwood v. Hammond, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 31, 40-41) and 
the reclamation of part of the minerals imbedded in the lands 
subject to the trust that likewise become unnecessary for 
the purposes of the trust. [2] Such a partial revocation 
of the trust will in no way impair the public interest in 
commerce, navigation, and fisheries in Long Beach harbor, 
and thus the revocation does not conflict with the manifest 
purposes of sections 2 and 3 of article XV of the Constitution. 
(See People v. Oaliforonia Fish 00., supra, 166 Cal. 576, 598; 
Oimpher v. Oity of DaTeland, 162 Cal. 87, 90 [121 P. 374].) 
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that, to the extent affected by such partial revocation, the 
income derived from the production of oil and gas from the 
tide and submerged lands of Long Beach harbor ' 'is no 
longer required for navigation, commerce and fisheries. nor 
for such uses, trusts, conditions and restrictions as are im-
posed by" the statutes granting the said tide and submerged 
lands in trust. (Stats. 1951, p. 2445.) That determination 
and finding is conclusive upon this court in the absence of 
evidence indicating that the abandonment of the public trust 
will impair the power of succeeding legislatures to protect, 
improve, and develop the public interest in commerce, navi-
gation, and fisheries. (Oounty of San Diego v. Hammond, 
6 Cal.2d 709, 726 [59 P.2d 478, 105 A.L.R. 1155] ; Boone v. 
Kingsbury, supra, 206 Cal. 148, 183; People v. Oalifornia 
Fish 00., supra, 166 Cal. 576, 597; Oakland v. Oakland Water-
front 00., supra, 118 Cal. 160, 185.) [4] Plaintiffs' sole 
contention on this point, that succeeding generations might 
have need for the monies thus freed from the trust for develop-
ment and improvement of the state's harbors, waterways, 
and fisheries, is a matter of speculation and is insufficient of 
itself to overcome the legislative determination. More-
over, since the revocation in question does not contemplate 
or authorize the alienation of the tide and submerged lands 
free from the trust, succeeding legislatures can, if they deem 
it necessary for the purposes of the trust, reestablish the 
public trust on all the income derived from the production 
of oil and gas from the lands in question. 
The next question is whether the revocation effected by 
the 1951 statute operates to transfer the monies involved to 
the state, as the plaintiff in intervention contends, or whether 
it operates as a transfer of those monies to the city of Long 
Beach, as defendants contend. In an early case concerning 
title to former pueblo lands, which the state held subject 
to a public trust for it municipal purposes," this court said 
that" [t]hrough such repeal [of the act by which the admin-
istration of the trust was transferred to the city of Monterey] 
the entire property held for public use-which would include 
the public lands-would revert to the state, and no limitation 
being imposed upon the legislature under the constitution 
of 1849· in that respect, could be then disposed of in any 
manner it saw fit." (Oity of Monterey v. Jacks, 139 Cal. 
·The prohibition on "the making of any gift, of any public money 
or thing of value" (Const., art. IV, § 31) was not added to the Consti-
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542, 555-556 [73 P. 4361, affirmed in 203 U.S. 360 [27 S.Ct. 
67, 51 L.Ed. 220]; see also San Francisco v. Oanavan, 42 
Cal. 541, 554-556; Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 624.) In 
an early Kentucky case, concerning a grant of public lands 
for school purposes, similar reasoning was employed: "thEl 
legislature granted this land to the persons named in the 
trust for a certain purpose, and the title of the commonwealth 
did not pass from it to the grantees, except for that purpose; 
and, when the object of the trust became extinct, the title 
reverted to the commonwealth as a matter of law .... The 
reversion of title in such a case is . . . in consequence of 
the failure of the purpose for which it was granted." (Ken-
nedy v. McElroy, 92 Ky. 72 [17 S.W. 202, 22 S.W. 442, 443].) 
[5] The reasoning in these cases is the same as that govern-
ing private trusts in which, in the absence of an express 
provision to the contrary, a revocation of the trust results 
in a reversion of the trust property to the settlor. (Civ. 
Code, § 2280; see 3 Scott on Trusts (1939), § 345.3.) That 
this reasoning applies to the trust on which the tide and 
submerged lands in question were conveyed to the city of 
Long Beach is indicated by the language in Oity of Long 
Beach v. Morse, sltpra, 31 Cal.2d 254, 257, that the "city is 
a trustee and as such 'assumes the same burdens and is 
subject to the same regulations that appertain to other trustees 
of such trusts.' [Citation.] " Defendants' reliance on the 
statement in Oity of Long Beach v. Marshall, 11 Ca1.2d 609 
[82 P.2d 362], that the lands were granted to the city in 
fee simple, is therefore ill founded. It was clearly recognized 
in that case that the city's title in fee simple was subject 
to the public trust (11 Ca1.2d at 613; and see Oity of Long 
Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, 259), and the problem 
of the clTect of a rf'vocation of the trust was not then before 
the court. [6] Moreover, trustees normally hold title to 
the corpus of the trust in fee simple, but only for the purpose 
of carrying ont the objects of the trust. (See Oity of Long 
Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, 258.) \Vhen the trust 
is terminated, the corpus does not become the individual 
prolwrty of the trustee; it reverts to the settlor. 
Defendants also contend that the dictum in Atwood v. 
Hammond,4 Ca1.2d 31, 44 [48 P.2d 20], that "the state could 
not by unilateral action divest the city of its title, nor annex 
a different use to this eighteen acre parcel [of reclaimed 
tidelands]," established the rule thRt although the state can 
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of the trust results, not in a reversion to the state as grantor, 
but in the ownership by the city of an absolute title to the 
lands originally conveyed to it in trust. This contention 
is based on the assumption that, pursuant to a conveyance 
to it from the state of lands subject to a public trust, ~he 
city acquires property or contractual rights that are beyond 
the power of the Legislature to alter. [7] Even if a con-
veyance, such as the one to the city of Long Beach in the 
present case, from the state to a municipal corporation is 
considered as a contract between the city and the Gtate or 
as creating property interests in the city, the state act,;ng 
through the Legislature has the power to alter contractual or 
property rights acquired by the municipal corporation from 
the state for governmental purposes. (Oounty of Alameda v. 
Janssen, 16 Cal.2d 276, 284 [106 P.2d 11, 130 A.L.R. 1141] ; 
Rat'lroad Oom. v. Los Angeles R. Oorp., 280 U.S. 145, 156 
[50 8. Ct. 71, 74 L.Ed. 234]; Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 
U.S. 182, 188, 191-192 [43 8.Ct. 534, 67 L.Ed. 937, 29 A.L.R. 
1471] ; Pawhuska v. Pawhuska O·il &- Gas 00., 250 U.S. 394, 
398-399 [39 8. Ct. 526, 63 L.Ed. 1054] ; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 
207 U.S. 161, 178-179 [28 8.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151] and cases 
cited: New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works 00., 142 
U.S. 79, 91 [12 8.Ct. 142, 35 L.Ed. 943]; see also Brooklyn 
& R-ichmond Ferry 00. V. United States, 167 F.2d 330, 333; 
Schulz, "The Effect of the Oontract Olause and the Four-
teenth Amendment Upon the Power of the States to Oontrol 
Municipal Oorporations," 36 Mich.L.Rev. 385, 387-398, 408.) 
[8] A municipal corporation has no privileges or immuni-
ties under the United States Constitution that it can invoke 
against the will of the state (Williams V. Mayor & Oity Ooun-
c·il of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 [53 S.Ct. 431, 77 L.Ed. 
1015]), and under the California Constitution a freeholder 
city, such as the city of Long Beach, is exempt from legis-
lative control only as to "municipal affairs." (Const., art. 
XI, § 6; Eastlick v. Oity of Los Angeles, 29 Ca1.2d 661, 665 
[177 P.2d 558, 170 A.L.R. 225] and cases cited.) [9] It is 
clear in the present case that any interest of the city of Long 
Beach in the tidelands was acquired not as a "municipal 
affair," but subject to a public trust to develop its harbor 
and navigation facilities for the benefit of the entire state, 
and was therefore subject to the control of the Legislature. 
(Oity of Monterey v. Jacks, supra, 139 Cal. 542, 555-556.) 
Moreover, the construction of the 1951 statute for which 
defendanti contend would result in its unconstitutionality. 
... 
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[lOa] If the statutory revocation operates as a transfer of 
the monies affected thereby to the city of Long Beach, such 
a transfer would be a gift of public monies in violation of 
section 31 of article IV of the Constitution.· Defendants 
argue that the development of the harbor without expense 
to the state was sufficient consideration for the original grant 
of the lands in trust, and that, the grant having thus been 
made, the state had nothing more of value to convey and 
the 1951 statue merely r<>leascd certain conditions and re-
strictions on the original grant. [11] Although the question 
of gift has never been directly discussed in any of the cases, 
it is clear that grants in trust of tide and submerged lands 
to municipal corpcJrations have been made in furtherance 
of the interest of the entire state in the development of its 
harbors and thus such grants do not violate the constitutional 
prohibition against gifts. (See City of Long Beach v. Morse, 
supra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, 262; Miller v. Stockburger, 12 Ca1.2d 
440,444 [85 P.2d 132] ; Atwood v. Hammond, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 
31, 45; Oakland v. Oakland lV at el'front Co., supra, 118 Cal. 
160, 189; City of N ewporf Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal.App.2d 
23, 29 [102 P.2d 4381.) Defendants contend, however, that 
the transfer to the city of the monies released from the trust 
by the 1951 statute would not violate the constitutional pro-
hibition against gifts bet'ausc the state had nothing of value 
to convey and the city received nothing of value by reason of 
that statute. There is no merit in this contention. [lOb] Ift 
as defendants contend, the city is entitled to those monies, 
it is entitled to them by reason of the statute. If defendants' 
interpretation of the statute is the correct one, the city now 
has available for general municipal expenditures millions of 
dollars that were not available to it before the enactment 
of the 1951 statute. (City of Long Beach v. Morse, supra, 
31 Ca1.2d 254, 262.) There being no benefit to all the people 
of the state from such a transfer, it would be a gift of public 
monies and thus prohibited by the Constitution. 
County of Los Llngcles v. SOllihcrn Calif. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 
2d 378 [196 P.2d 773], on which defendants rely, is not 
ilH!Onsistent with this conclusion. That case involved tp,e 
validity of franchises acquired under the provisions of section 
53G of the Civil Code. In hol(ling that such franchises are 
not gifts within the lllC':llIillg" of section 31 of article IV, we 
*' I Sec. 31. 'l'l!e Legislature shall have no power .•• to make any gift 
or authorize thE' mal,ing of any gift, of any public money or thing of 
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said that "the state is assured of a continuing benefit in 
return for the privileges granted under section 536. . . . 
The company must not only construct a telephone system 
but it must render service, and if it fails to do so the franchise 
terminates. Thus the state receives a benefit during the life 
of the franehise, since in order to retain it the company must 
continue to serve the public . . . 
"Since the offer of a franchise in section 536, when accepted, 
results in a binding agreement supported by a valid consid-
eration, there is no gift within the meaning of the consti-
tutional prohibitions." (32 Ca1.2d at 388.) 
[12] It is suggested, however, that the expenditures pur-
portedly authorized by section 260.8 of the charter of the 
city of Long Beach are expenditures for public purposes 
and thus that a transfer of the funds in question from the 
state to the city would not be a gift within the meaning 
of section 31 of article IV of the Constitution. There is no 
merit to this contention. That section of the Constitution 
specifically forbids the making of a gift of public monies or 
thing of value to any municipal corporation, and all lawful 
expenditures of such corporations are necessarily for public 
purposes. Moreover, as we said in Oity of Oakland v. 
Garrison, 194 Cal. 298, 304 [228 P. 433], in reference to 
the appropriation of county funds for the improvement of 
a city street, "It is not sufficient, therefore, that the appro-
priation here in question be for a public purpose. It must 
also be for a purpose which is of interest and benefit generally 
to the people of the county of Alameda. The question, then, 
is whether the improvement of this particular street within 
the city of Oakland is a matter of such general county interest 
that the county funds may properly be expended therein." 
[13] Applying that principle to the present case, we cannot 
hold that the construction and establishment by the city 
of Long Beach of storm drains, a city incinerator, a public 
library, public hospitals, public parks, a fire alarm system, 
off-street parking facilities, city streets and highways, and 
other expenditures that have been authorized to be made 
from the "Public Improvement Fund," are of such general 
state-wide interest that state funds could properly be expended 
thereon. Such expenditures are for pureJy "municipaJ af-
fairs" within the meaning of section 6 of article XI of the 
Constitution. (See Oity of Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 34 
Ca1.2d 595, 599 [2]2 P.2d 894] [sewer]; Jardine v. Oity of 
Pasadena, 199 Cal 64, 68 [248 P. 225, 48 A.L.R. 509] [isola-
---
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tion hospital] ; Stege v. City of Rickrnond, 194 Cal. 305, 312 
[228 P. 461J [city streets] ; City of Pasadena v. Paine, 126 
Cal.App.2d 93, 98 [271 P.2d 577J [city library] ; Alexander 
v. Mitckell, 119 Cal.App.2d 816, 826-827 [260 P.2d 261] 
[off·street parking facilities]; Perez v. City of San Jose, 
107 Cal.App.2d 562, 566 [237 P.2d 548] [city highways]; 
Beard v. City & County of San Francisco, 79 Cal.App.2d 
753, 755 [180 P.2d 744] [public hospital] ; Arrnas v. City of 
Oakland, 135 Cal.App. 411, 420 [27 P.2d 666, 28 P.2d 422] 
[fire protection 1.) Moreover, they are normal expenditures for 
a municipal corporation to make, and to hold that a 
grant of public monies from the state to defray such ex-
penditures is not a gift within the meaning of section 31 
of article IV of the Constitution would render meaningless 
the express prohibition therein against gifts to "municipal 
corporations." [14] We conclude, therefore, that in view 
of the intendments in favor of the constitutionality of a 
statute (Jersey Maid Jltlilk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Ca1.2d 
620, 636 [91 P.2d 577]. and cases cited), we must adopt 
the construction of the 1951 statute indicated by City of 
Monterey v. Jacks, supra, 139 Cal. 542, 555-556, and we hold 
that the partial revocation of the trust effected by that statute 
necessarily results in a reversion to the state of the monies 
thus released from the trust, and the city holds those funds 
upon a resulting trust for the state. It is, therefore, un-
necessary to consider plaintiffs' other constitutional objections 
to the construction of the statute urged by defendants. 
[15] It remains only to consider the intervening plaintiff's 
contention that the provision in the 1951 statute, "[ t] hat 
all of the revenue heretofore derived, or to be derived, by 
said city from 'dry gas,' obtained from said lands is hereby 
declared to be free from the public trust .•.. " (italics 
added], is an unconstitutional llttempt to validate the past 
unlawful expenditure of such funds for general municipal 
purposes. (Const., art. IV, § 25 [16'1. [18].) It was held in 
Trickey v. City of Long Beach, 101 Cal.App.2d 871 [226 
P.2d 694], that the income derived from the production of 
"dry gas" from the tide and submerged lands granted to 
the city was subject to the public trust for commerce, navi-
gation, and fisheries, and that the expenditure of that income 
for general municipal purposes was unlawful. It follows 
from the conclusion reached above that as a result of the 
1951 statute the city holds all of the funds" heretofore derived, 
or to be derived" from the production of "dry gas" from 
') 
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the lands in question subject to a resulting trust in favor 
of the state. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
In my opinion, the revenue in question from oil and gas 
production on tidelands, which lands had beell previously 
granted by the stat.e to the city of Long Beach. have been 
validly released by the Legislature from the trust, and the 
city may properly use the revenue so released for municipal 
improvements. 
The precise question before us appears to be one of first 
impression, but I do not believe that the conclusions reached 
in the majority opinion can be reconciled with the decisions 
of this court in Atwood v. Hammond, 4 Cal.2d 31 [48 P.2d 
20], and Oity of Long Beach v. Marshall, 11 Ca1.2d 609 [82 
P.2d 362], nor with the implications of the more recent de-
cision of this court in Oity of Long Beach v. Morse, 31 Cal.2d 
254 [188 P.2d 17]. These and other authorities wilJ be 
hereinafter discussed, but as the solution of the present prob-
lem involves a determination of the respective rights of the 
state and the city to the revenues which have been admittedly 
released from the trust, the fundamental question to be con-
sidered is that of the nature of the trust under which the 
tidelands are held. It appears to me that this question 
has been erroneously oversimplified in the majority opinion, 
which treats the state as the "trustor" or "settlor," and 
the Act of 1951 (Stats. 1951, p. 2<143) as a "revocation," 
or at least a "partial revocation" of the trust, resulting in a 
"reversion" to the state of said revenues. This reasoning is 
based upon an assumed analogy in all respects between the 
trust upon which the tidelands are held and the ordinary 
private trust, but I can find no proper basis for such analogy. 
On the contrary, the trust involved here appears to be sui 
generis, and any attempt to determine the respective rights 
of the state and city upon such reasoning can lead only to 
confusion and to erroneous conclusions. 
When the state embarked upon the program of granting 
the tidelands to local authorities, it was dealing only with 
those portions of land along the shore line which were sub-
merged at high tide and exposerl at low tide. It is a matter 
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at many points where the shore line is precipitouS', and that 
the greatest areas of tidelands are found in and about our 
bays and at the mouths of our rivers, near which points many 
of our municipalities have developed. In their natural state, 
these tidelands were apparently of little value for any pur-
pose, and were obviously of little value for navigation or 
commerce because of the relatively shallow water which cov-
ered them even when the tides were at their highest. Further-
more, the extent of the so-called tidelands has been subject 
to change over the years by reason of natural accretions to, 
or the wearing away of, the shore line, or by reason of 
artificial improvements. by way of dredging and filling. In 
fact, the improvement of any tidelands for the purpose of 
navigation and commerce normally contemplates the artifi-
cial change of a part or all of such land into high land 
bordering upon water deep enough for the norma] purposes 
of navigation and commerce. Hence, the state, in granting 
the tidelands to the local authorities, was dealing with lands 
having apparently little value and having irregular bound-
aries which could not be precisely and permanently deline-
ated. The Legislature no doubt concluded that some of such 
lands should be improved and could best be improved in 
the interest of navigation and commerce by the local authori-
ties which administered the lands bordering such tidelands. 
It therefore embarked upon its program, and the grants to 
the local authorities were accompanied with the express or 
implied undertaking that such lands would be so improved 
by the local authorities without expense to the state. Such 
was the express stipulation in the grant of the tidelands 
under consideration to the city of Long Beach. (City of 
Long Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, 257.) Pursuant 
to such undertaking, those lands have been extensively im-
proved over the years by the city of Long Beach by the 
expenditure of tremendous sums of money. 
In the light of these observations, let us consider the nature 
of the "trust" with which we are dealing. It has been said 
that these tidelands were acquired by the State of California 
by the act of admis.;;ion. subject however to a trust for 
navigation, commerce and fisbing. (City 0/ Long Beach v_ 
JJ arsJtall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609, 614.) The precise nature of 
this trust has never been clearly defined, and, as above 
indicated, the trust appears to be ,<;11,1 generis. (See cases 
discussed in Illinois Central R. Co. v. lllinois, 146 U.S. 387 
[113 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018], and Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 
I 
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Cal. 148 [273 P. 797].) Some things nevertheless appear 
certain. First, that the State of California was itself a trustee 
rather than a trustor in relation to any trust imposed upon 
such tidelands, and that the beneficiaries of such trust were 
not alone the people of this state but all the people of the 
United States. Thus, it has been indicated that the federal 
government could enforce such trust. (Boone v. Kingsbury, 
supra, 206 Cal. 148, 189.) Second, that the trust does not 
permanently attach to all the lands which were originally 
tidelands, for many of the areas embraced in the original 
tideland areas have been improved by developing such lands 
into high lands, and portions thereof have become either the 
property of municipalities (Atwood v. Hammond, supra, 4 
Ca1.2d 31, 38) or of private owners (Boone v. Kingsbury, 
supra, 206 Cal. 148, 189), free of any trust when no longer 
necessary for the accomplishment of the trust purposes. 
In determining the nature and extent of the trust imposed 
upon the tidelands, such lands should be distinguished from 
the lands involved in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 
19 [67 8. Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889], which, under the com-
plaint in that action, included only lands "lying seaward 
of the ordinary low water mark on the coast of California." 
(P. 22.) We are here concerned only with lands lying shore-
ward of such low water mark. While the trusts affecting both 
types of land may have a common origin, no question was 
raised in the cited case concerning the respective rights 
of the state and the federal government in "tidelands down 
to the low water mark." (P. 30.) Rather, the court merely 
refused to extend the law relating to the latter, as expounded 
in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. (U.S.) 212 [11 L.Ed. 
565], to cover the land there in controversy to the seaward 
of the low water mark. 
The historical background of the trust in tidelands throws 
some light upon the peculiar nature of such trust. The 
original colonies acquired these tidelands by right of con-
quest, and after the conquest, such lands were held by them 
"as they were by the king, in trust for the public uses of 
navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves, 
piers, light-houses, beacons and other facilities of navigation 
and commerce. Being subject to this trust, they were pubZiCJi 
juris; in other words, they were held for the use of the people 
at large. • . . It is also true that portions of the submerged 
shoals and fiats, which really interfered with navigation, 
and could better subserve the purposes of commerce by being 
) 
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filled up and reclaimed, were disposed of to individuals for 
that purpose. But neither did these dispositions of usele3s 
parts affect the character of the title to the remainder." 
(Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, supra, 146 U.S. 387, 457, 
quoting from Stockton v. Baltimore &- N. Y. R. Co., 32 F. 
9, 19, 20.) 
With respect to the tidelands of California, it was said 
that" upon the admission of California into the Union upon 
equal footing with the original States, absolute property in, 
and dominion and sovereignty over, all soils under the tide 
waters within her limits passed to the State, with the con-
sequent right to dispose of the title to any part of said soils 
in such manner as she might deem proper, subject only to 
the paramount right of navigation over the waters, as far as 
Rueh navigation might be required by the necessities of com-
merce with foreign nations or among the several States, the 
regulation of which was vested in the general government." 
(Illinois Central R. Co. v. lllino·is, supra, 146 U.S. 387, 465, 
quoting approvingly from Weber v. State Harbor Comrs., 
18 Wall. (U.S.) 57, 65 [21 L.Ed. 798].) 
In Boone v. Kingsbury, supra, 206 Cal. 148, at page 180. 
in referring to "the title in the soil of the sea or arms of 
the sea," it is said that such title "at common law was 
vested in thc sovereign in trust for the people"; and in 
referring to the title of the states and to the exhaustive study 
therein made of the entire subject, it quotes approvingly on 
page 180 from Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 [14 8.Ct. 548, 
38 L.Ed. 331], as follows: "The foregoing summary of 
the laws of thc original states shows that there is no universal 
and uniform law upon the subject; but that each state has 
dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders 
according to its own views of justice and policy ..•. " 
In summary, it appears from these authorities that his-
torically the title to the tidelands has been held by the sov-
ereign subject to a trust which is defined in general terms 
as a trust for navigation, commerce and fishing; that the 
exact nature of the trust has never been clearly defined; 
that the main purpose of the trust is to maintain a shore 
line which is generally free from any substantial interference 
with the public enjoyment of navigation, commerce and 
fishing; that the sovereign may deal with the tidelands in 
almost any way so long as there is no substantial impairment 
of the trust purpose; and that any substantial impairment 
of the trust purpose in the tid(>lands within any state could 
})e abated by the state or the federal government. 
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Concerning the California tidelands, we find that title to 
all of such lands, with the possible exception of title to those 
lands covered by prior Mexican grants, was acquired by 
the state by the act of admission following their acquisition 
by the United States under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 
In dealing with those lands in the early case of Oakland v. 
Oakland Water Front 00., 118 Cal. 160, at page 183 [50 
P. 277], the court said: " ... the several states hold and 
own the lands covered by navigable waters within their 
respective boundaries in their sovereign capacity, and pri-
marily for the purpose of preserving and improving the 
public rights of navigation and fishery. They have in them 
a double right, a jus publicum and a jus pr'ivatum. The 
former pertains to their political power·-their sovereign do-
minion, and cannot be irrevocably alienated or materially 
impaired. The latter is proprietary and the subject of private 
ownership, but it is alienable only in strict subordination to 
the former." 
The same distinction between the state's sovereign and 
proprietary rights in tidelands was made in Santa Oruz v. 
Southern Pac. 00., 163 Cal. 538, 544 [126 P. 362], and in 
People v. Oalifornia Fish 00., 166 Cal. 576, 597 [138 P. 79]. 
In its sovereign capacity, the state held these lands subject 
to a public trust for navigation, commerce and fishing; and 
it could not completely divest itself of its responsibilities as 
such trustee to the impairment of the public interest. (Boone 
v. Kingbury, supra, 206 Cal. 148, 183, 189; Oity of Long 
Beach v. Marshall, supra, 11 Cal.2d 609, 614.) However, in 
its proprietary capacity and as the proprietary owner, the 
state could grant the tidelands to a municipality subject to 
this public trust. (Atwood v. Hammond, supm, 4 Cal.2d 
31, 37; Oity of Long Beach v. Marshall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609, 
614-615.) This distinction between the state's sovereign and 
proprietary rights and duties in respect to the tidelands was 
not cons~dered material for the purpose of the decision in 
Oity of Long Beach v. Marshall, Sllpl'a (see pp. 614-615), 
but as will- hereinafter appear, such distinction is important 
in the determination of the question presented here, 
Various legislative acts, other than the Act of 1951 (Stats. 
1951, p. 2443), affecting the Long Beach tidelands have been 
discussed in numerous cases. (Oity of Long Beach v. Lisenby, 
175 Cal. 575 [166 P. 333] ; Oity of Long Beach v. Marshall, 
supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609; Miller v. Stockburger, 12 Ca1.2d 440 
[85 P.2d 132] ; Oity of Long Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Cal. 
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2d 254.) Such discussion will not be repeated here except 
insofar as it affects the particular problem before us. 
In City of Long Beach v. Marshall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609, 
at page 616, it was said: "It remains only to point out briefly 
that the history of tideland grants in this state, and the 
actions of the various legislatures and the courts in connection 
therewith, show a general agreement that the tidelands were 
conveyed to municipalities in fee, subject only to the public 
trusts and the limitations and reservations specified in the 
acts; and that until the discovery of these valuable oil rights 
in the Southern California tidelands no serious doubt was 
ever expressed as to the title of the municip~)ities." 
The Marshall case was brought on the theory that "the 
rights in oil and other minerals belonged to the state and 
not to the city" (p. 612), and such theory was held untenable. 
(See also Miller v. Stockburger, supra, 12 Cal.2d 440.) The 
court there said at page 613, in speaking of this original grant 
to the city of Long Beach in 1911 (Stats. 1911, p. 1304): 
"Giving this language its ordinary and reasonable meaning, 
it would seem clear that the state intended to and did convey 
whatever title or interest it had in these lands to the city, 
in fee simple, subject to certain conditions and upon certain 
trusts. " I t follows from the two cited cases that ever since 
the original grant in 1911, the rights in the oil and other 
minerals under the Long Beach tidelands and the proceeds 
from the extraction thereof have belonged to the city, rather 
than to the state, subject only to the trust under which the 
city held such tidelands. 
In City of Long Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, the 
question of the right of the city to divert a portion of the 
proceeds of the production of oil and gas to the city's general 
"Public Improvement Fund" was before this court. That 
case arose prior to the Act of 1951 (Stats. 1951, p. 2443) 
and before there had bcen any express declaration by the 
Legislature that such proceeds were no longer necessary for 
the trust purpose. This court there said at pages 257 and 
258 : "If the proceeds from the sale of oil and gas are 
regarded as corpus (see Rest. Trusts, § 238; Bogert, Trusts 
and Trustees, § § 789, 828), they must be used for the pur-
poses set forth in the legislative grants in trust, for the city, 
as trustee, clearly has no authority to appropriate th::! corpus 
to its own uses contrary to the terms of the trust. If the 
proceeds are regarded as ineome from trust property, the 
truatee, in the absence of a legislative provision to the CO1&-
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frary, has no more right to them than it has to the corpus." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Since the decision in City of Long Beach v. Morse, supra. 
there has been enacted such "legislative provision to the 
contrary." In 1951 (Stats. 1951, p. 2443), the Legislature 
released a portion of such proceeds from the trust, being the 
precise portion which is in controversy here. By that act 
the Legislature expressly found and determined that from 
the revenue derived from oil production from the tidelands. 
the city has constructed upon these lands various harbor 
facilities" necessary or convenient for the promotion of com-
merce and navigation" at a cost of approximately $35,000.000; 
that from the same source the city has now available and 
unexpended approximately $75,000,000; that it will continue 
to receive from the same source for many years to come 
approximately $24,000,000 per annum; that in additioll, the 
city obtains large quantities of "dry gas" derived from the 
natural gas produced from said lands, which it sells; that 
in view of the already large expenditures on these lands 
for harbor improvements and the available and anticipated 
sums, the expenditures of more than 50 per cent of the revenue 
from the oil production for trust purposes would be "economi-
cally impracticable, unwise and unnecessary"; that "50% 
of all revenue" from the oil produced on these tidelands 
and "all of the revenue . . . derived from 'dry gas' . . . is 
hereby declared to be free from the public trust for navigation, 
commerce and fisheries, and from such uses, trusts, conditions 
and restrictions as are imposed by any of said above-entitled 
acts. " (Stats.] 951, pp. 2444-2445.) 
It was clearly within the power of the Legislature to release 
such portion of the city's income from the trust upon finding 
that such portion was no longer required for the purposes 
of the trust. (Atwood v. Ham rnon d, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 31, 
35-36, 39, 41-42; Illinois Central R. 00. v. Illinois, supra, 
146 U.S. 387, 452-453.) In the Atwood case, the Legislature 
had made a similar declaration with respect to a portion 
of the San Diego tidelands, releasing them from the trust. 
(Stats. 1929, ch. 642, p. 1058.) This court there said at pages 
42 and 43: "We are of the view that it was competent for 
the legislature upon finding that the eighteen-acre tract was 
'not longer required for navigation, commerce or fisheries,' 
to free it from the public easem~nt for those purposes." It 
was further held thAt the IJegislature could net thereafter 
deal witlt such land rlpon the thoory that the state owned 
) 
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the land so released from the trust. If then the Legislature 
may validly release a port.i(Jl1 of the tidelands themselves from 
the trust upon finding that ~uch lands are no longer required 
for trust purposes, it follows that the Legislature may validly 
release a portion of the proceeds of such tidelands. Such 
was the necessary implication of this court in City of Long 
Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, when it predicated 
its decision there on the "absence of a legislative provision" 
expressly finding that such proceeds were no longer required 
for trust purposes and releasing them from the trust. 
The power of the Legislature to make such declaration 
under appropriate circumstances is derived from its sov-
ereignty and the duty imposed upon it in accepting the tide-
lands under the act of admission, subject to the public trust. 
It is true that this court, in discussing the possible distinc-
tion between the state's sovereign and proprietary rights in 
City of Long Beach v. Marshall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609, said 
at page 614: "There is neither logic in, nor practical neces-
sity for the 'double fee' doctrine"; and on page 615 said, 
in speaking of the grant to the city: Such language cannot 
be distorted to mean that the grant to the city is only of rights 
of sovereignty in the sense of political or governmental 
power. The argument of the state's 'double fee' is met by 
the very statutory language which grants the land, for it 
conveys' all' the' right, title and interest' of the state. What-
ever the state had by way of title or interest, however, divided 
it may have been, it all passed under the plain words of the 
grant. " That language should be read in the light of the 
problem then before the court, and it should not be inter-
preted so broadly as to declare that the state, acting in its 
sovereign capacity, did not retain the power and duty to 
determine when any portion of the tidelands might be de-
clared no longer nccessary for trust purposes, and therefore 
be released from the trust. That the state in its sovereign 
capacity retained such power and duty is clearly indicated in 
several cases. (Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 184, 191 
[273 P. 797] ; Atwood v. Hammond, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 31, 38-
43; City of N ewpo-rt Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal.App.2d 23, 2~ 
[102 P.2d 438] ; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois. supra, 146 
U.S. 387, 453-455), and is clearly implied in City of Long 
Beach v. Morse, S1tpra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, which was based upon 
the" absence of a legislative provision" finding that the pro-
ceeds were no longer required for trust purposes. As was 
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". • . by virtue of the prior grants to the city, the state 
has divested itself of all interest in such land excepting its 
interest as the sovereign in protecting the public tr·ust." 
(Emphasis added.) In other words, the only right reserved 
by the state with respect to the tidelands or their proceeds 
was its sovereign right to protect the trust and to declare 
when, if ever, any portion of such lands or their proceeds 
might no longer be required for the trust purposes and might 
be released from the trust without any substantial impair-
ment of the trust purposes. In the present case the Legis-
lature has exercised that right and has released the disputed 
proceeds by the 1951 enactment. (Stats. 1951, p. 2443.) 
The majority opinion declares that the solution of the 
present problem depends upon "the validity and effect of 
the 1951 statute revoking in part the public trust on the 
income derived from the lands in question. Thus, the prin-
cipal issues to be resolved in the present case are whether 
the revocation was a valid exercise of the legislative power, 
whether the revocation operated as a transfer from the state 
to the city of the monies affected thereby, and, if so, whether 
such a transfer would offend the constitutional prohibition 
against gifts of public moneys." (Emphasis added.) 
Thus the entire majority opinion is based upon the theory 
that the Act of 1951 was a partial "revocation" of a trust 
created by the state and a "transfer from the state to the 
city of the monies affected thereby." I agree that the solu-
tion of the problem depends upon the validity and effect of 
the 1951 statute, but I cannot agree with the reasoning of 
the majority opinion. It treats the state as the "trustor" or 
"settlor," with the property reverting "to the settlor" upon 
the termination of the trust; whereas, as heretofore indicated, 
the state was itself only a trustee with respect to the public 
trust under which the tidelands were previously held by it, 
and it had previously conveyed all its proprietary interest 
to the city. This court has clearly declared that the title to 
the tidelands, and therefore to the proceeds thereof, was 
thereafter in the city, not the state, subject only to the trust, 
for "whatever the state had by way of title or interest, ... 
it all passed under the plain words of the grant" to the city 
of Long Beach; and that such conveyance carried with it 
"the mineral rights in the land." (City of Long Beach v. 
Marshall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609, 615, 616.) 
It follows that the Act of 1951 was not a "reyocation" 
of any trust in any true sense of the word. The state was 
... 
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not the trustor or settlor to which the lands or their proceeds 
would revert upon the termination of the trust. It is true 
that the state's grant to the city employed the words "in 
trust for the uses and purposes and upon the express condi-
tions following ... " (City of Long Beach v. Morse, supra, 
31 Ca1.2d 254, 256) ; but the grant did not create the trust. 
which already existed and under which the state itself held 
the property as trustee, and said grant merely imposed such 
conditions as the state deemed necessary to protect such pre-
existing public trust. Following the grant to the city the 
tidelands and the procceds therefrom belonged to the city 
of Long Beach, subject only to the trust, and hence the 
exercise of the sovereign power by the state in 1951, in 
declaring a portion of the proceeds released from the trust, 
did not in any sense effect a "transfer" of anything "from 
the state to the city." It therefore appears that the claim 
that the Act of 1951 was invalid under section 31 of the 
Constitution cannot be sustained. The majority opinion con-
cedes that the original grants of the tidelands to the cities 
"do not violate the constitutional prohibition against gifts," 
and it follows that the exercise by the state of its power to 
release a part of the tidelands or the proceeds from the trust 
is merely an exercise of the limited power retained by the 
state in its sovereign capacity following the original grant 
of all its right, title and interest in said tidelands. The valid-
ity of such a release was sustained in Atwood v. Hammond, 
supra, 4 Ca1.2d 31. 
It may be conceded that the majority opinion, by starting 
from an erroneous premise, reads quite plausibly. The 
erroneous premise, however, appears to be unfortunate, for 
the premise itself docs violence to the principles laid down 
in the authorities, and more particularly to those clearly 
cnunciated in Atwood v. Jl ammond, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 31, and 
City of Long Beach v. Marshall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609. Fur-
thermore, thc conclusions reached run contrary to the prin-
ciples laid down in those cases and the other authorities 
above cited. These authorities sustain the judgment of the 
trial court. 
It may well be that the state, as a matter of policy, should 
have reserved to itself the mineral rights in the Long Beach 
tidelands. It has made snch reservation in later grants to 
other cities and counties, such as Santa Barbara (Stats. 1931, 
p. 1742), Ventura (Stats. 1935, p. 869), and Santa Cruz (Stats. 
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not make any similar reservation in the grant to the city of 
Long Beach, and I find no justification for now declaring, 
contrary to the principles enunciated in the prior decisions 
of this court, that the state has any right, title or interest 
therein or to the proceeds therefrom. 
In my opinion, the judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
SHENK, J.-J concur in the dissenting oplDlon of Mr. 
Justice Spence and deem it unanswerable. A further word 
seems desirable from my standpoint. 
When Boone v. Kingsbury was decided by this court in 
1928 [206 Cal. 148 (273 P. 797)] ::: expressed the view as 
the sole dissenter that permits proposed to be issued by the 
state for exploration and production of oil and gas from tide-
lands of the state would be inconsistent with the trust under 
which the state held those lands, namely, for commerce, navi-
gation and fisheries. That case involved tidelands of the 
state outside of any municipality. It was there decided by 
the majority that the state owns those lands in fee subject 
only to the limited trust and that the granting of permits 
there sought to be issued by the state on a royalty basis 
for the production of oil and gas would not be inconsistent 
with the trust. The holding in that case has been the law 
of the state without deviation since that time. It has also 
been the law of the state that in granting to municipalities 
the tidelands within their borders the state conveyed the fee 
subject only to the same trust under which the state owned 
them. If leasing directly by the state for oil and gas produc-
tion is not inconsistent with the trust the same rule should 
apply to a municipality occupying the same position as its 
grantor, the state. The case of City of Long Beach v. Morse, 
31 Ca1.2d 254 [188 P.2d 17], specifically left the way open 
for further legislation on the subject. That legislation was 
supplied by the Act of 1951 (Stats. 1951, p. 2443). By that 
enactment there is a legislative finding that the use of the 
proceeds from oil and gas. production by the city of Long 
Beach is not in any way affected by the terms of the trust. 
If the city of Long Beach is bound by the terms of the trust, 
as the majority holds, the state likewise is bound by the 
same trust. The only logical deduction to be drawn from 




224 MALLON v. CITY OF LONG BEACH [44 C.2d 
clared is also fastened on the state's title and right to the 
use of the proceeds from oil and gas development and produc-
tion on tidelands. 
Following the case of United States v. California in 1947 
(332 U.S. 19 [67 8.Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889]) the United 
States granted to the several states bordering tidelands and 
to their grantees the right,· title and interest of the federal 
government in and to such tidelands (Public Law No. 31, 
67 Stats. p. 29, approved May 22, 1953). By that enactment 
the government reserved from the grant the right to exercise 
its constitutional powers over commerce and navigation and 
partieularly stated in section 6 of the act that the reservation 
should "not be deemed to include, proprietary rights of 
ownership, or the rights of management, administration, leas-
ing, use, and development of the lands and natural resources 
which are specially recognized, confirmed, established, and 
vested in and assigned to the respective States and others 
by section 3 of this Act." If the title of the city of Long 
Beach is encumbered by the trust, as the majority holds, the 
title of the State of California is also subject to the trust, 
and falls within the reservations of the act of Congress. 
The only way to avoid this conclusion is to declare, as we 
should, that the proceeds from oil and gas development here 
involved fall within the proprietary classification of the 
property of the city of Long Beach in accordance with the 
statutory and decisional law of the state and as contemplated 
by the recent act of Congress. 
The petition of Respondent City of Long Beach for a re-
hearing was denied May 4, 1955. Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be 
granted. 
